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Abstract
The concept of crisis has frequently been used to characterize seismic historical events 
of the 21st century, and many scholars have interpreted it according to Agamben’s 
elaboration of the state of exception. Following this paradigm, the crisis period in 
Greece is often perceived as a violent rupture from the previous state of relative 
stability that spanned the whole social spectrum. We argue, however, that although 
the idea of exceptions and rupture may be valid for phenomena such as urban policies 
or social control, it does not apply in the context of the labor market. Attempting 
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to go beyond the idea of crisis as a rupture, in this article we will illustrate how the 
current crisis instead masks a number of pre-existing phenomena. We do so through 
qualitative empirical data and analysis of workers’ perceptions regarding one of the 
most emblematic phenomena of the so-called Greek crisis: labor market deregulation.
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Greece – crisis – precarity – workers
1 Introduction
“The Greek crisis ends here tonight.” With this celebratory announce-
ment, made in the summer of 2018, the European Union’s Economic Affairs 
Commissioner, Pierre Moscovici, declared Greece’s exit from the crisis and 
the reinstatement of its economy. However, the return to a state of supposed 
economic normality has been far from smooth for the majority of Greeks. 
Since 2010, under the three Economic Adjustment Programs agreed with the 
ec, the ecb and the imf, Greece has been pummeled by consecutive waves 
of austerity. The harsh measures they imposed were the prerequisites for the 
largest bailout loan ever administered to a country and included explicit direc-
tives mandating severe reductions in public spending and welfare provision, a 
full-scale downsizing of the public sector through massive lay-offs and a 
recruitment embargo, cuts to pensions and public sector wages, and plans for 
the mass privatization of public assets.1
Since the outbreak of the 2008 crisis and the agreement of the first eco-
nomic adjustment program for Greece in 2010, labor market reform has been 
a condition of every loan to the Greek government by the EU and the imf. 
Indeed, labor market deregulation has been so diligently implemented that 
it is in fact the only part of the adjustment program to have met all of the ini-
tial targets2 set for it by the Troika. During the ten years of external economic 
control, Greek governments agreed to a series of drastic legislative reforms of 
1 Sotiris, P. “Greece: The Downsizing of a Country.” Greek Left Review (2012), available online 
at https://greekleftreview.wordpress.com/2012/09/17/greece-the-downsizing-of-a-country/; 
Dalakoglou, D. and A. Vradis, eds. Revolt and Crisis in Greece: Between a Present Yet to Pass and 
a Future Still to Come (Oakland, CA: ak Press, 2011).
2 Targets were either missed entirely or only partially met in the following areas: privatizations, 
deficit reduction and structural reforms in the public and private sectors.
poulimenakos et al
10.1163/24714607-bja10004 | Journal of Labor and Society (2021) 1-21Downloaded from Brill.com05/12/2021 04:48:30AM
via free access
3
labor relations and the increased flexibility of the labor market. Those reforms 
included deregulation of the collective bargaining system, normalization of 
flexible and precarious labor, individualization of labor contracts, disman-
tling of the Labor Inspectorate and reduction of the national minimum wage 
from €751 gross per month to €586. However, there is no robust evidence that 
these adjustments contributed to preventing economic downturn and boost-
ing growth, as had been proclaimed. On the contrary, the Greek economy lost 
25% of its gdp, while unemployment soared from 9.5% in 2009 to 27% in 2012. 
Moreover, adjustment policies came at an enormous social cost as poverty and 
inequality increased dramatically.3 Ethnographies of the Greek crisis reveal 
that from its early stages, the resilience of both society and the economy have 
been under intense strain.4
Generally, the concept of crisis seems apt for describing such seismic 
reform. For this reason, many scholars have adopted it in order to analyze the 
phenomena of massive adjustments.5 Crisis is often employed in relation to 
Agamben’s state of exception.6 Following this line of thought, crises provide 
an ideological framework of fear and psychological paralysis that facilitates 
rapid social reengineering in the form of extremely unpopular reconfigura-
tions which, under regular social conditions, would be resisted and opposed. 
According to this paradigm, the crisis period in Greece constitutes a violent 
rupture with the previous state of relative normality which emerged during 
the ‘metapolitefsi’ period following the collapse of the Regime of the Colonels 
in 1974. This is exemplified by the social control and repression policies imple-
mented during the years of crisis in order to address what Agamben refers to 
as tumultus. In order to prevent political institutions from collapsing, the state 
discards normal legal procedures and fast-tracked laws rapidly become the 
new normal. In this sense, crisis and the consequent establishment of a long/
permanent state of exception is a rupture. The 2010 anti-terrorism law crim-
inalizing the use of specific protest apparel including hoodies (the so-called 
“koukoulonomos”) was an “exceptional” use of legislative and executive force, 
for instance. Indeed, although similar legislations are not at all new during 
3 Karamessini, M. “The Greek Social Model: Towards a Deregulated Labour Market and 
Residual Social Protection.” In The European Social Model in Crisis: Is Europe Losing Its Soul?, 
ed. D. Vaughan-Whitehead (Geneva/Cheltenham: ilo, 2015), 230–288; Papatheodorou, C., 
“Economic Crisis, Poverty and Deprivation in Greece: The Impact of Neoliberal Remedies.” In 
Greek Capitalism in Crisis, ed. S. Mavroudeas (London: Routledge, 2020), 205–221.
4 Dalakoglou, D. and G. Agelopoulos, eds. Critical Times in Greece: Anthropological Engagements 
with the Crisis (London: Routledge, 2018).
5 Klein, N. The Shock Doctrine (London: Macmillan, 2008).
6 Agamben, G. State of Exception (Chichago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
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the “metapolitefsi”, what seems interesting here is the fact that what has been 
criminalized was not, in fact, merely a political stance, but mostly the regular 
use of a specific apparel. The proverbial “black hoodie” has been considered 
guilty of enacting a performative lifestyle, not necessarily connected with a 
manifestation of an openly political stance -and especially in the urban con-
text-, in the need of been repressed by one of “a continuous series of small 
coups d’état” in Agamben’s terms.7
Nevertheless, many authors are discussing lately either or not the ideolog-
ical framework of the State of Exception suits the analysis of the Greek crisis.8
For what concerns the qualitative data we shall present here shows, in the 
case of labor market deregulation in Greece, the crisis does not constitute a 
rupture with the previous paradigm so much as an intensification of existing 
processes.9
2 The Research Sites
Our research consisted of qualitative enquiry in 4 separate locations in Greece. 
The authors’ diverse positionality in the field and their research interests led to 
the multi-sited approach. Moreover, the particular research sites are indicative 
of different economies within Greece, a variety that reveals different disposi-
tions towards labor by the individuals. From the class polarized environment 
of the Athens metropolis, to Paros as the representative of seasonal, touristic 
(para)economy, Lesvos as the center of a newly emerged employment scene 
due to the refugee situation, and Sparta, a traditionally middle-class small 
town with high pluriactivity, the crisis is a concept that only gains meaning in 
relation to the people’s biographies and affiliations within particular economic 
environments. The researchers conducted interviews where they were already 
working, so although outside the remit of their specific ethnographic projects, 
interviews were carried out in locations familiar to them. As the project’s aim 
was to confute the perception of the crisis as a rupture in a “normal” economic 
7 Agamben, G. “For a Theory of Destituent Power.” Chronos (February 2014), available online at 
https://criticallegalthinking.com/2014/02/05/theory-destituent-power/.
8 Rakopoulos, T. “The Crisis Seen from below, within, and against: From Solidarity Economy to 
Food Distribution Cooperatives in Greece.” Dialectical Anthropology 38 (2) (2014), 189–207, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-014-9342-5; Athanasiou, O., P.K. Goldberg and N. Pavcnik. “Trade 
Reforms and Wage Inequality in Colombia.” Journal of Development Economics 74 (2) (2004), 
331–366; Douzinas, C. Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe 
(London: Polity Press, 2013).
9 Dalakoglou, D. “The Crisis before ‘The Crisis’: Violence and Urban Neoliberalization in Athens 
1.” Social Justice 39 (1) (2013), 24–42.
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flow, diverse sites with their local particularities provided a wide variety of 
labor and social regimes to test the hypothesis of non-rupture. Specifically, 
this project aims to show that the “crisis” is not perceived as such on the basis 
of objective, static economic facts. On the contrary, if a subject is to perceive 
the condition as a “crisis” or a “rupture” or not, is based on particular socio-
cultural factors as the class position from which the subject is perceiving his/
her reality, the ties with the state and local perceptions of labor as morality. 
Therefore, a multi-sited ethnography was crucial as to reveal different stances 
on the so-called crisis. Between 2017 and 2018 we conducted interviews with 
more than 50 workers, most of them on repeated occasions. All interviewees 
were between 25 and 45 years of age and the majority had experience of work-
ing both before and after the crisis. We interviewed both people whose par-
ents were born in Greece and people of migratory background. The sites are 
as follows:
– Athens—capital city of Greece and a European metropolis that is home 
to 3.75 million people.10
– Paros—one of the largest islands of the Cyclades in the Aegean Sea. It 
has about 12 000 registered residents and is typical in depending almost 
entirely on tourism. Between May and July 2019 alone, 334 291 tourists 
visited the island.
– Lesvos—a border-island located in the Northeastern Aegean with 86 000 
inhabitants recorded in the 2011 census. Due to its close proximity to 
Turkey, Lesvos has been central in the refugee question since the summer 
of 2015. From 2015 until today, it has been the European arrival point for 
more than 600 000 refugees, necessitating significant funds from the EU. 
Various ngo s have set themselves up on the island, thereby changing its 
employment landscape.
– Sparta—a provincial town as well as the administrative capital of 
Laconia prefecture in southern Greece. According to the 2011 census, it 
has roughly 16 239 inhabitants.11 Its economic structure is comprised of 
small-scale retailers, agriculture and public services.
3 The Greek Capitalist Model and the Crisis before the “Crisis”
Research on the pre-crisis era (1980–2008) in the fields of economics, sociol-
ogy and demography indicates an enduringly idiosyncratic labor market with 
10 Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority (2014).
11 Source: http://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/-/publication/SAM03/.
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intrinsic elements of informality and deregulated labor relations for specific 
social groups.12 Prior to the crisis, Greece had the highest self-employment 
and business ownership rates in the EU, with the vast majority of businesses 
consisting of small-scale family stores sustained by unpaid family labor and/
or small numbers of undeclared or semi-declared employees.13 During this 
period, both labor inspection institutions and, consequently, the enforcement 
of labor law and protection mechanisms, were very weak (Karamesini, 2015). 
Public servants, by contrast, enjoyed a highly protected working environment 
with strong trade unions.14 This was due to the Greek state’s strategy of mass 
recruitment into the public sector, in a bid to incorporate (and therefore neu-
tralize) a significant portion of the population that had been radicalized in 
the period following the civil war. This dualistic nature of the historical devel-
opment of labor relations in Greece laid the ground for a confrontational and 
syndicalist habitus 15 among the industrial working-class, as well as amongst 
public servants. Contrastingly, amongst the unskilled or technically skilled 
working-class scattered around small family businesses, it has forged a social 
group that is unconnected, unorganized, and in most cases, lacking both a for-
mal labor contract and representation.
Between the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, at the height of the 
so-called “golden era” of Greek development,16 a new social group, undetected 
by quantitative datasets, came from the North to join Greece’s pre-crisis pre-
cariats.17 This was a period of sweeping change globally, during which existing 
12 Karamessini, “The Greek Social Model: Towards a Deregulated Labour Market and Residual 
Social Protection”; Sakellaropoulos, S., ed. “Change in Social Stratification in the Greece of 
Crisis (2009–2017).” In Greece’s (Un) Competitive Capitalism and the Economic Crisis (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 123–138.
13 Katsios, S. “The Shadow Economy and Corruption in Greece.” South-Eastern Europe Journal 
of Economics 4 (1) (2006), 61–80; Tsoukalas, K. The State, Society and Labor in Post-War Greece 
(in Greek) (Athens: Themelio, 1985); Petmesidou, M. and A.M. Guillén. “‘Southern-Style’ 
National Health Services? Recent Reforms and Trends in Spain and Greece.” Social Policy & 
Administration 42 (2) (2008), 106–124.
14 Tsoukalas, The State, Society and Labor in Post-War Greece (in Greek); Papageorgiou, V. 
“Discourses and Practices of Resistance to the Neoliberal Domination (in Greek)” (2014), 
avaialble online at https://independent.gr/άρθρα/public-culture-online/λόγοι-και-πρακτικές-
της-αντίστασης-στη-νεοφιλελεύθερη-κυριαρχία?fbclid=IwAR1ONAplYQJJjuFXCag3oczwKyq5el
g5xKuwUOZv9AqgtLYPKcxKZuS8l2Q.
15 Bourdieu, P. Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology volume 
16. Series ed. J. Goody (Cambridge University Press, 1977).
16 Kaplanis, Y. “An Economy That Excludes the Many and an ‘Accidental’ Revolt.” In Revolt 
and Crisis in Greece, eds. Vradis, A. and D. Dalakoglou (Oakland, CA: ak Press, 2011), 215–
228; Dalakoglou, “The Crisis before ‘The Crisis’: Violence and Urban Neoliberalization in 
Athens 1.”
17 Standing, G. The Precariat. The New Dangerous Class (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).
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socialism collapsed and more than 600 000 migrants from ex-socialist Balkan 
countries crossed Greece’s borders. The migrants who arrived during this 
period, mostly undocumented or semi-documented, survived under extremely 
precarious conditions. They were exploited as cheap, undeclared labor, and 
often worked under hazardous conditions. It was the labor of these migrants 
which enabled the infrastructural boom culminating in the construction fever 
building to the 2004 Athens Olympics.18
While one stream of the Balkan migratory flow scraped a living in Athens’ 
hostile metropolitan environment by building the Greek capital’s “European 
face”, another contingent moved to the countryside to evade document checks 
by Greek authorities. The cheap labor migrants provided to small-scale employ-
ers also contributed significantly to rural Greece’s modernization and blending 
into the EU. According to the Anthropologist Christopher Lawrence, the social 
and cultural transformation of the Greek countryside could only be achieved 
through the creation of a vulnerable, marginalized class of cheap migrant work-
ers with no rights, who helped make Greek agricultural products become com-
petitive on the global market.19 Their labor enabled rural Greece’s conversion 
from a place defined by a system of poor domestic production marked by a con-
servative, familial culture to a relatively prosperous agricultural market in which 
social liberalization also transformed the position of women and children.
As should be evident from our discussion of these diverse social groups who 
have been experiencing labor precarity and socioeconomic uncertainty since 
well before the so-called crisis era, the labor of workers who are beyond the 
purview of both legislation and a broader notion of normality is something 
that has been inherent to the development of capitalism in Greece. As we now 
show in our analysis, the state of being in “crisis” presupposes a particular hab-
itus of having previously lived in relative security, as well as certain physical 
and mental predispositions that allow individuals to experience the distinc-
tion between crisis and normality.
4 Informal Labor: “Same Old, Same Old”
According to our research, informal labor was the most common form of labor 
for people living in all of our field sites, both before and during the crisis. The 
18 Dalakoglou, D. The Road: An Ethnography of (Im)Mobility, Space and Cross-Border 
Infrastructures in the Balkans (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017); Dalakoglou, 
“The Crisis before ‘The Crisis’: Violence and Urban Neoliberalization in Athens 1.”
19 Lawrence, C.M. Blood and Oranges: Immigrant Labor and European Markets in Rural Greece 
(New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2011).
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exception to this pattern is the group of ngo workers in Lesvos who, for the 
first time in their lives, are now formally employed. It is striking to note that 
those interviewees, however, described their working conditions as “unreal” or 
“European”. Our sample consisted of skilled laborers and university graduates 
who are currently working or have worked outside their field of expertise, and 
unskilled workers.
Our first interviewee is Menipos, a 31-year-old who has lived his whole life 
in his town of origin. He graduated from a technical high school but did not 
get into university, so he has been working in various jobs since he was 18. As 
his town lacks any heavy- or light-industrial sector employment options, those 
who do not possess agricultural land are confined to the retail and service sec-
tors: the plethora of cafes, mini-markets, gambling stores, fast-food outlets, 
telecommunications stores etc. In every job, both before and during the crisis, 
Menipos was paid “under the counter”. He has therefore never had insurance, 
nor has he accumulated a single pension credit. As he told us:
I’ve been working since 2004 and I still don’t know what it’s like to be 
legally employed, you know with extra wages at Christmas and all that. 
I’m 31 years old now and I don’t have a single ensimo.20 What am I going 
to do? For all these years, I’ve been getting cash in hand from the bosses 
as if we were pals. That’s if I get paid at all. I remember back in 2005 I 
was working in a hotel, and the guy just refused to give me the money I’d 
worked for. I had to put pressure on him for three months and to threaten 
him with legal action to get the money. Of course, after that I left. When 
you’re unregistered you rely on the boss’ good will. In another job I had 
in around 2007 in a fast food outlet, the boss wanted me to work for 15–16 
hours to get the minimum wage. What can you do? The only thing you 
can do is quit.
Menipos now works in a store. When asked whether he sees any changes now-
adays, he said wages were slightly higher before the crisis, but otherwise no. 
Employers only care for quick profits.
Melina is 28 years old. She returned to her hometown after obtaining her 
degree in social work. As a high school student she had worked as a waitress 
during weekends and vacations. Since coming home, she has been working in 
a bar again. From Melina’s perspective, labor relations have not deteriorated 
20 Ensima/ένσημα(plr.) or ensimo/ένσημο (sing.) refers to employers’ contribution to the Social 
Insurance Department to cover the employee’s insurance. A worker needs to accumulate a 
specific number of ensima in order to retire and qualify for a pension.
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during the crisis and may even have improved. She told us that just like before, 
employees like her mostly work in the black, but since the crisis, labor inspec-
tions are slightly stricter.
Cafeterias and bars are workplaces in which cash-in-hand employment is 
the norm. Like Melina, Kostas, a barista in a cooperative café-bar in Athens 
failed to see any difference in working conditions in his sector:
I think the worst years were from 2012 to 2014. We certainly had big eco-
nomic problems in the country before, but there was a lot of black mar-
ket labor and there was no social turmoil. You just had a whole country 
working, most of them “underground”, and nobody did anything about it, 
as usual . . . Now we still have more or less the same situation. We might 
get shocked by the unemployment numbers we hear about, but most 
people are working and working off the books.
Another point that was raised by interviewees in Paros was that actual working 
hours during the summer season never correspond with what is written on 
the books, and people are forced to work overtime without exta wages. The 
casualness of these agreements enables employers to exercise extreme levels 
of labor control over workers. Lida works as a shop assistant on Paros island. 
She used to work for the same amount of money, €1200 per month, as a marine 
biologist for a research center in Athens for far fewer hours. In the shop, many 
hours are undeclared and “an employer will laugh at you if you ask for a day 
off in the summer season.” The practice of paying in black is a response to 
the implementation of the Memorandum’s fiscal plan for tackling tax evasion. 
Almost every worker we interviewed agreed that tax inspections are getting 
stricter than before the crisis, and this was a widespread rumor on the island 
in the summers during which we conducted fieldwork. As Katerina, an interior 
designer told us,
It’s only in winter that I’ve worked totally off the books, because in the 
summer there are many inspections and employers don’t want to face 
the risk of getting caught. But I always prefer not to work in the black, 
because I want my (tax and insurance) contributions and benefits to be 
in order.
Working for an international ngo with a formal labor agreement in Lesvos 
was an unprecedented experience for our interviewees there. As graduates in 
the social sciences, the majority of them had worked in a variety of jobs before 
the refugee crisis hit Greece. In many cases, informality in the labor market 
“the greek crisis ends here tonight”
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seemed completely normal to these workers. Andreas, who used to work as 
a delivery driver, felt that the economic crisis had not changed anything. In 
his job employers only declared 3 hours for every 10–12-hour shift, and driv-
ers were unable to accrue credits or insurance. If they wanted a job, they had 
to accept this standard exploitation. When we asked him whether he was 
referring to the pre-crisis era or the present, he told us it was the same now as 
before; that people everywhere would always try to make as much as possible 
with the least effort.
In addition, within the current flexible labor environment, workers in this 
informal economy do not have clear job descriptions. Nasos talks about his 
experience in a pizzeria during the pre-crisis era:
I was supposed to be doing deliveries, but really, I did a bit of everything—
I helped make the pizzas, clean the tables, wait on people . . . the more 
you do the better you are, “a good boy”. There was no contract, and so this 
would last as long as he’d let me keep the job, or as long as I’d stay.
5 Precarity, Pluriactivity and Coping Strategies
As the labor experiences described in the previous section demonstrate, work-
ing people in Greece, especially the younger generation, have faced precarious 
conditions and grim futures since before the crisis. A further aspect of these 
precarious conditions is the frequent change of job our interviewees reported, 
particularly those from Sparta; only one had held the same job since she started 
working while the majority changed jobs every few months.
Researchers like Tsoukalas21 view the recent increase in flexible patterns of 
employment, the zero-hours contract and the freedom to jump between jobs 
as an emancipatory development for the working-classes. He argues that since 
the 19th century, capitalism’s domination has been based purely on its ability 
to affect a total absorption of workers’ time in such a way that it gave them no 
other option than to sell their labor. For Tsoukalas, the new forms of flexible 
labor together with the subsidized income through state allowances (or forms 
of universal income) give workers the ability to distance themselves from wage 
labor and pursue different ways of earning a living so as to diversify their skills 
and their subsequent ability to negotiate better terms of employment.
Our research findings do not support this theory. The majority of those 
we interviewed did not appear to be jumping from job to job out of choice, 
21 Tsoukalas, The State, Society and Labor in Post-War Greece (in Greek).
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but instead, as their stories testify, because of arbitrary actions taken by their 
employers. It is however true that workers demonstrate signs of pluriactivity22 
that is, they are earning money through activities that are parallel to their 
waged job, mostly in the informal economy. Nevertheless, such parallel activ-
ities do not represent a conscious step away from wage labor or a strategy to 
better negotiate with employers, but are instead basic survival strategies.
More recent, empirical studies such as Koumenta and Williams’ research 
on zero-hours contracts in the UK23 associate the precarious forms of employ-
ment with low wages and underemployment that are more likely to bind the 
workers more to wage labor through the pursuit of more than one wage job 
than empowering them to negotiate better working conditions. As Koumenta 
and Williams illustrate, the regime of zero-hours contract is more susceptible 
to working places that traditionally lack union presence.
Kalliope, a 30-year-old graduate in social theology, could not find a job in 
her sector, so in 2010 she decided to return to her hometown and take any job 
she could find. She described the highly exploitative conditions in several jobs 
she moved through in quick succession—working several shifts in a row in the 
black, sometimes for 18 hours straight; not getting paid several months running 
as the boss told her he was broke and having to leave with nothing; signing for 
bonuses she never received and finally surviving by working several part-time 
undocumented jobs, “at the same time I do baby-sitting, informally, here and 
there. I can barely make ends meet with these two jobs but what can you do?”
Pavlos is 36 years old and lives in Athens. He holds a postgraduate degree in 
chemistry but never managed to find a job in his field. When we spoke to him, 
he was a temporary worker in the municipality of Athens. His job is part of the 
Job Centre’s (oaed) EU-funded program for rehabilitating unemployed work-
ers. Although those participating in this program actually work in the public 
sector, they are considered “beneficiaries” and therefore fall under the remit of 
private law. Contracts are 8 months long and wages are half those of perma-
nent staff:
I’m working in the program now. They took me on because of my de-
gree but that doesn’t mean I do chemistry there, mostly I coordinate 
the movements of the garbage trucks but at least I’m using my degree 
(laughs). The money is shit. I get €495 where others in the same job get 
€1000 or more, I suppose it’s our generation’s curse. In the afternoons, I 
22 Ibid.
23 Koumenta, M. and M. Williams. “An Anatomy of Zero-Hour Contracts in the UK.” Industrial 
Relations Journal 50 (1) (2019), 20–40.
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do another job—I write university theses for people who are either not 
capable of doing it or just can’t be bothered. It’s ridiculous, they think 
that if they get their degree then everything will be okay, but if you don’t 
know the thing you’re studying, how can you do anything with it? On the 
other hand, if you look at my case, then you realize that you only need the 
formal qualification. Anyway, the money’s good, though it consumes a lot 
of your time. You can get €1000 to €1500 for a thesis every two months. 
I know it’s illegal and maybe it’s not right, but you add that to the €495 
from the program and then you have a real wage.”
The experiences discussed above, and the fact that Pavlos used the label “real 
wage”, show that pluriactivity today does not imply a move away from wage 
labor, nor is it a choice, as Tsoukalas argues. The cases show that pluriactivity 
in the informal economy and informal wage labor are part of the same process, 
and they now constitute the only survival strategy available to most young 
people.
6 The “Public” Sector Today
One of the major repercussions of the “shock” treatment24 Greece was sub-
jected to during the financial crisis was the devaluation and demonization of 
the public sector.25 The country’s image as run by an outmoded, populist and 
bureaucratic state—with supposedly vast numbers of public employees and 
untapped reserves of public assets—was conjured up, and then blamed for 
the debt. This discourse helped justify a freeze in public sector recruitment (by 
imposing the rule of 1 hire per 10 retirements), which was rolled out irrespective 
of the operational needs of public administration or candidates’ qualifications.
The 8 month long public workfare (κοινοφελής εργασία/koinofelis ergasia) 
organized in municipalities by the oaed, together with other similar 
EU-subsidized programs, constitute the only way in which young people today 
can get experience working in the public sector. However, as Pavlos’ case shows, 
despite the fact that they are performing core roles, these young people’s labor 
conditions differ from those of permanent staff.
24 Klein, The Shock Doctrine.
25 Giannis Mavris, “The Rise of Conservatism: Political Ideologies in Greece after the 
Memorandum” (in Greek) (2007), available online at https://www.mavris.gr/4943/
political-ideology/.
poulimenakos et al
10.1163/24714607-bja10004 | Journal of Labor and Society (2021) 1-21Downloaded from Brill.com05/12/2021 04:48:30AM
via free access
13
Melina, who we met above, is now working as a social worker in a munic-
ipality near her town through one of these programs. Her description of the 
experience highlights these differences:
If you think about it too much you’ll go crazy. The municipality didn’t 
even have a social worker before, and now I’m covering the whole region. 
That means I have a huge caseload, and yet for some reason I get half 
or even a third of the money that permanent staff get. But it’s not just 
the money. You know if you read our contract you won’t find the word 
“employee” in it. We are referred to as “beneficiaries”—like they’re doing 
us a favor and that’s why we’re working for nothing. I remember in the 
first month I was here there was a national strike organized by the public 
servants’ union. We were told that we were not allowed to go on strike 
because we weren’t officially employed there! Screw that! I went on strike 
anyway. And then there’s also the way some of the permanent staff look 
at you. Like you’re inferior, like you don’t matter. In a way that’s true, be-
cause I’ll be out of here soon.
Alexis, who lives in Lesvos, describes his first experience as a psychologist for 
the Ministry of Public Order as part of the EU-subsidized espa26 project. Even 
though he had a high-status job and his position was an important one, he was 
still reliant on the support of his social network:
In the first job, we signed a normal contract. We had a problem with the 
leave conditions though—they told us that because the contract was for 
5 months we weren’t entitled to any leave, that leave entitlements were 
only for contracts of over 8 months or 1 year, I can’t remember exactly. 
The payment was also bad, even though it was through Εspa, payments 
were always late. I think, because we’re talking about 2012, they were de-
layed by at least 3 months, maybe more. The next job I had in the ministry 
was also delayed [the payment]. Not as much, but still plenty. The prob-
lem was that you needed to pay your social insurance fee to the pension 
and social security organization (teve),27 and you had to do that first in 
order for the next payment to be authorized, so if you didn’t have any sav-
ings, you had to borrow money to pay teve. So it was a vicious circle. This 
was going on in all the projects run by the Ministry of Public Order that 
I worked in as a psychologist, in deportation centers. The worst problem 
26 European Structural and Investment Funds of the European Union.
27 teve is the social insurance agency for freelancers.
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we had was from the end of 2014 to mid-2015, then pay was delayed for 
5 months […]
Eleonora, a 35-year-old journalist, decided to return to her village during the 
crisis. She is also working in a municipality, but not as part of the oaed’s pro-
grams. Instead she has been hired under the “special mayoral advisor” employ-
ment regime. The Greek constitution permits members of the Parliament as 
well as mayors to hire a number of “advisors” of their choice, outside of stand-
ard recruitment protocols for public servants. When the politician’s term ends, 
the special advisors are discharged, unless their successor wishes to keep them 
on. In the countryside in particular, these positions are usually distributed on 
the basis of patronage obligations. In this case, Eleonora was given the position 
because her mother is well-known in her village and has a very large social 
network, which translates into a significant pool of votes.
The day after we interviewed her, Eleonora told us the following story:
I’m in a damn difficult position today. A guy who worked for the municipal-
ity last month, in the black, cutting the grass or something, called me today. 
He said that the mayor refused to give him the money he was due. After he 
pressed him, the mayor told the guy to call me and ask me to give him my 
salary for this month! Do you understand what that means? I have to give 
my salary to some guy and work this month for free. Of course, I gave the 
mayor a call. He told me that I got this position thanks to him and so I had 
better obey. What should I do? Of course, my self-respect tells me to tell 
him to go fuck himself and quit, but where else am I going to work?
Finally, we also found evidence of informal labor in Lesvos. Menelaos, who was 
working informally for the municipality as a photographer told us:
It was an acquaintance of mine who works at a photography studio who 
mentioned the job to me. He told me that the municipality was opening 
up a position because they wanted photographers from all the photogra-
phy studios in Mytilene to go to the camps . . . and take pictures of the ref-
ugees for their documents. Naturally these pictures were taken for mon-
ey, it was €10 for 4 of them. So we worked inside the camp, one of the first 
to be built, and we took pictures and sold them. There was no contract 
with me, only with my boss, and the boss simply had his team and paid 
them . . . No, they didn’t have contracts, they were working because the 
money was good, €50 for 4 hours. So I thought, here we go! This is it! And 
that was my first experience working on the refugee question.
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As these stories make evident, Greece’s economy is defined less and less by 
a dichotomy between a protected public sector and a precarious private sec-
tor. Nowadays, many of those in the public sector actually work in a variety of 
ambiguous and hybrid public/private positions. In addition, the fear, precar-
ity and humiliation that characterize labor relations in the private sector have 
today colonized the public sector as well.
7 Precarity Tolerated? An Anatomy of Workers’ Consciousness
Any ethnographic study of labor market conditions should incorporate not 
only an exploration of the objective markers of deregulation, but also of work-
ers’ perceptions of labor and labor relations. The next phase of our research 
focused on investigating how the workers in our sample viewed their work-
ing conditions, both socially and politically. We observed a general aversion 
towards politics, and either a feeling of impotence with regards to changing 
their situation, or an unwillingness to attempt to do so.
How is it that people come to tolerate such working conditions? This ques-
tion opens up the problematic of social and political compliance and passiv-
ity—as it has been cast in anthropology. Understanding of this issue has, we 
believe, been obscured by the over-studied notion of “resistance”.28 Workers’ 
consciousness, we show, is shaped by various factors—most notably, local cat-
egories of social status, cultural specificities, networks of social relations and 
discourses about the crisis.
Melina talked to us about the poor conditions she and her colleagues toler-
ated working in bars and cafes:
Look, this is a small town and the businesses here are small-scale. That 
means that you know your boss personally, you would probably have been 
friends before he opened the bar. They make you think we’re all a big fam-
ily. And because of these personal relations, people are too embarrassed 
(ντρέπονται/ntrepontai) to talk to the boss about a raise or to denounce 
them. Not only are they embarrassed, but many of them even think it’s 
wrong to do so. The bosses exploit your pride (Τα αφεντικά σε πιάνουν στο 
28 Astrinaki, R. “Dis-Assembling the Social: The Politics of Affective Violence in Memorandum 
Greece.” In Violent Reverberations, eds. V. Broch-Due and B.E. Bertelsen (Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016), 143–171.
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φιλότιμο/se pianoun sto filotimo).29 Even I, who am pro trade-union and 
a leftist, sometimes I find myself too embarrassed to make a complaint.
This quote reveals how personal relations influence capital-labor relations in 
small towns and small businesses. These business owners generally come from 
the same social background as their workers, possess the same habitus30 and 
relate to them personally. The resulting familiarity in the workplace functions 
as an ideology that deters workers from claiming their rights.
When we asked Ioanna, a 22-year-old waitress from Athens, for her opinion 
about trade unionism, we got the same sense of moralism, “I’m not interested 
in all that . . . it’s just not in my character. I’m an easy-going person, I couldn’t 
raise my voice or anything like that.”
Working in bars and cafes also conferred a measure of social status on young 
employees. Nefeli, a 22-year-old doing an internship at a computer education 
center, said about her friends:
They’re killing each other (sfazontai/σφάζονται) for a job in [cc: Name of 
posh cafe in the town]. It’s very important to people to work there you 
know. If you’re a guy and you work there, then you’re definitely going to 
have a good girlfriend. Do you think they care if they’re exploited or given 
shit money? They just don’t.
Although an in-depth exploration of the question of consciousness is outside 
the scope of our research, it is clear we need to move beyond a purely econ-
omistic approach if we are to understand the subjective meaning of workers’ 
exploitation. As Daniel Knight notes,31 local signifiers of social status affect 
how conditions of crisis, prosperity and precarity are experienced.
Regarding the crisis, the majority of respondents considered it a product 
of the corrupt nature of politics. Only one articulated a specific argument on 
the nature of the crisis, while some even argued that the crisis was a purely 
psychological phenomenon.
As Nefeli puts it:
The crisis is in our heads. If you’re always saying to yourself “oh my god I 
don’t have money” and so on, then you’ll be in crisis. But if you stay calm 
29 Can be loosely translated as referring to the subjective moral obligation to show respect to 
someone.
30 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice.
31 Knight, D.-M. “Crisis and Prosperity: Status, Accountability and Time in Central Greece” 
(Durham: Durham University, 2011).
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and organize your life properly, you’re not going to have any problems. 
We should turn off our tv s. They’re scaring people. Come on, what crisis? 
Things are not so bad.
By contrast, Alekos, who works in a bakery, believes that the crisis is real and 
that it’s the people’s fault, “Look, the politicians are what they are but it’s our 
fault too. Everyone wanted to be a doctor or a lawyer in Greece. We wanted the 
sweet life. It was considered shameful to be a farmer or whatever. So then how 
did we think we were going to survive?”
Respondents’ accounts revealed a conflicted state in which precarity and 
material deprivation coexisted with passivity or acceptance of the existing 
reality.
8 Conclusions
Our findings on the social cost of deregulation are not confined to Greece. 
Indeed, there is a field of research that provides strong empirical evidence 
that deregulation policies weaken welfare state provisions.32 The anthropo-
logical preoccupation with economic relations among people has focused, 
from the outset, on critiquing the universal validity of the notion of homo 
economicus. Homo economicus, or economic man, describes a particular ten-
dency of human nature that inclines towards the maximization of utility and 
the rational evaluation of people’s activities. According to this line of thought, 
economic interactions among humans make up a discrete and abstract field 
of relations in which human beings act like mathematical entities, in isolation 
from their other social characteristics and identities. The origins of this anthro-
pological type, which is credited with providing the ideological foundations of 
the newly emerging capitalist economy, can be traced back to the formation of 
classic political economy.33
32 Lewis, P. “(How) Do Flexible Labour Markets Really Work? The Role of Profitability 
in Influencing Unemployment.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 33 (1) (2009), 51–77; 
Giovannoni, O. “Functional Distribution of Income, Inequality and the Incidence of Poverty: 
Stylized Facts and the Role of Macroeconomic Policy,” UTIP Working Papers (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 2010); Jaumotte F. and C. Osorio Buitron, “Inequality and Labor 
Market Institutions” (Washington, DC: imf, 2015).
33 Mill, J.S. “On the Definition of Political Economy, and of the Method of Investigation. ” In 
Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, volume 7, ed. J.S. Mill (London: 
Routledge/Thoemmes, 1844).
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The seminal work of Mauss34 dealt a heavy blow to the homo economicus 
conception of human nature. His analysis of economic behavior and practices 
in various so-called non-Western societies revealed that instead of maximiz-
ing profit, people strove, through a well-established system of gift exchange, 
to enhance social relations. For Mauss, these peoples’ first priority was not to 
accumulate wealth, but rather, by giving it away in the form of gifts, to secure 
alliances, social solidarity and moral superiority.
The Maussian paradigm has undergirded interest among social scientists 
in the social and moral aspects of people’s economic behavior. According to 
E.P. Thompson’s moral-economy interpretation of the 18th century food riots in 
England, the uprising was not a rational, automatic response by the people to 
hunger and poverty. Instead, what led people to collective action was the trans-
gression, by the market, of deeply rooted moral values concerning food prices 
and the place of food in the realm of social reproduction. Since Thompson’s 
time, the term moral economy has mainly come to signify informal economic 
practices that are alternative or in opposition to the logic of the commodity 
and the market, and which are based on specific social and cultural values.35
However, as some scholars have recently noted,36 conceptualizations of the 
moral aspects of economic relations should not be limited by the tendency of 
researchers to record practices that defy market logic and capitalism in gen-
eral. Because all economic activities contain moral dimensions, we should 
trace morality as a motive not only for anti-market action, but also for those 
activities that promote compliance and the normalization of economic rela-
tions, even where these may be unjust or unacceptable.
Dimitra Kofti’s research37 sets out to apply this broader conception of 
morality in economic activity to the analysis of flexible forms of labor in a 
Bulgarian factory in the post-socialist era. Kofti argues that the apparent tol-
erance workers show for low-wage and flexible regimes of labor is formulated 
within complex and intertwined moral values that relate to their lives both 
inside and outside the factory. For example, familial relations between workers 
34 Mauss, M. The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, 2nd edn. (Chicago, 
IL: Routledge, 2001).
35 Palomera, J. and T. Vetta. “Moral Economy: Rethinking a Radical Concept.” Anthropological 
Theory 16 (4) (2016), 413–432.
36 Ibid; Narotzky, S. “The Payoff of Love and the Traffic of Favours.” In Flexible Capitalism, ed. J. 
Kjaerulff (Oxford: Berghahn, 2018), 173–206; Kofti, D. “Moral Economy of Flexible Production: 
Fabricating Precarity between the Conveyor Belt and the Household.” Anthropological 
Theory 16 (4) (2016), 433–453.
37 Kofti, “Moral Economy of Flexible Production: Fabricating Precarity between the Conveyor 
Belt and the Household.”
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who are also married to each other may have the effect of silencing the gender 
pay gap thanks to a sense of household solidarity.
Our research also indicates that people do not necessarily evaluate their 
working conditions in terms of objective exploitation, but rather through a 
complex set of ideas about morality and social status that extend beyond the 
workplace. As in the case of the posh provincial cafe, precarious working con-
ditions become less important where the job in question offers a status that 
increases one’s prospects of an intimate relationship. Or, as Melina’s case sig-
nals, even the left-wing persuasions and trade-union history of an employee 
can be compromised by the high value people attribute to informal relations. 
In our examples, friendship, the informal relation par excellence, merges with 
the informality of labor to produce a situation in which keeping labor infor-
mal comes to be understood as a moral obligation for workers. In his book 
Bullshit Jobs: A Theory38 David Graeber supports that it is the dominant 
Puritan-capitalist work ethic that makes work a determinant of self-worth for 
the workers which is independent to the economic or productivity outcomes 
of their labor.
8.1 Crisis as (Non)rupture
Discourses often appear in the Greek media or among political elites that orbit 
around the rhetoric of “rupture” and the sudden deregulation that resulted in 
the loss of established workers’ rights. These discourses are based on statistical 
research and legislation that was passed during the crisis years. This project, by 
contrast, offers an ethnographically grounded critique of the inherent abstrac-
tions that these perceptions of the crisis entail. As anthropologist Henrik Vigh 
argues,39 any talk of crisis as an episodic, sudden event that disrupts a previ-
ously ordered and sustainable environment is always the expression of a biased 
class, gender or race position. This is so because in every social formation, and 
across the global system’s divisions, there exist structurally marginalized social 
groups—the poor, sans papier immigrants and so on—who are always “in cri-
sis”. It is precisely their position in the system of exploitation that creates the 
conditions for the normality that members of the more privileged social strata 
experience during times of non-crisis.40
38 Graeber, D. Bullshit Jobs: A Theory (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2018).
39 Vigh, H. “Crisis and Chronicity: Anthropological Perspectives on Continuous Conflict and 
Decline.” Ethnos 73 (1) (2008), 5–24.
40 Dalakoglou, “The Crisis before ‘The Crisis’: Violence and Urban Neoliberalization in 
Athens 1.”
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A unique feature of deregulation in Greece is that, since 2010, these pol-
icies have been implemented at an extremely accelerated pace and in their 
most drastic form, thereby constituting an innovation in the pace of change 
in the EU’s Common Labor Market which, until then, had been evolving grad-
ually over decades. The Greek case might set a precedent for how reforms will 
be implemented elsewhere. Illustrative of this possibility is the January 2017 
warning by the UK’s largest equity fund owner that Brexit may result in a 30% 
decrease in wages.41
Greece offers an ideal case study for investigating the above- mentioned 
phenomena. Since its accession to the then eec in 1981, the Greek economy has 
undergone significant transformations that were followed by equivalent adjust-
ments in labor legislation, in line with developments at the EU level.42 Labor 
market flexibilization was a key aim of the EU policies that were due to be imple-
mented by the early 2000s in order to address the challenges posed by globaliza-
tion.43 However, these policies came at a cost for most workers. Even before the 
crisis, in 2007, 20% of the Greek workforce was receiving a monthly salary of less 
than €700,44 thereby creating a cheap, yet highly qualified labor force. Moreover, 
between 2003 and 2010, Greece ranked second in the list of countries with the 
highest rate of temporary employment in the EU.45 The social and political 
consequences of this phenomenon—that is, the ongoing social crisis they pro-
duced—fed into the dynamics that culminated in the so-called Greek Crisis.46
In order to understand the consolidation of contemporary labor relations 
in Greece, we have to focus on the intersection between global economic 
transformation, as manifested during the economic crisis, and the pre-already 
existing socio-economic contradictions and cultural specificities that charac-
terize the Greek mode of micro-production. Given that “preceding concepts 
of social relations operate simultaneously alongside, or underneath capitalist 
systems”,47 we should cease to think of changes in capital-labor relations as 
41 See The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/brexit-guy-
hands-says-cut-wages-30-percent-twenty-years-private-equity-a7540986.html (accessed 15 
September 2019).
42 Dedoussopoulos, A., V. Aranitou, F. Koutentakis and M. Maropoulou. Assessing the Impact of 
the Memoranda on Greek Labour Market and Labour Relations (Geneva: ilo, 2013).
43 Ibid.
44 Kouzis, Y. The Working Conditions after the Memorandum (in Greek:Το Εργασιακό Περιβάλλον 
Μετά Από Το Μνημόνιο) (2012).
45 Pavlopoulos, D. Temporary Employment in Greece and in the EU: An Approach Using 
Longitudinal Data (in Greek) (Athens: Observatory of Social and Economic Developments. 
Labour Institute of the Greek General Confederation of Labour, 2015).
46 Dalakoglou, “The Crisis before ‘The Crisis’: Violence and Urban Neoliberalization in 
Athens 1.”
47 Knight, Crisis and Prosperity: Status, Accountability and Time in Central Greece.
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produced by a crisis-induced “rupture”, and focus instead on specifying local 
ways of doing capitalism.
In the context of Greece, where the tertiary economy is dominant, wage 
labor has always been short-term and precarious. The ostensible resistance of 
small-scale businesses to big capital’s constant pressure,48 which apparently 
creates a distinct form of “Greek capitalism”, is in fact sustained by undeclared 
wage labor, denials of salary payments, informality and refusal of basic labor 
rights. This condition is normalized through sociocultural elements such as 
the moralization of the informal-friendly relation between the capital owner 
and the worker, or the attribution of social status to certain jobs. Long before 
the crisis, the younger generations faced extremely uncertain living condi-
tions, with the majority forced to invent additional types of informal work in 
order to make ends meet.
In the case of the public sector, there has indeed been a sort of rupture 
between the pre- and post-crisis eras. After the neoliberal restructuring of the 
public sector, the security that older generations enjoyed ceased to exist. The 
experience that younger people have of working in the public sector today is 
of ambiguous semi-public, semi-private contracts that last for five or eight 
months, and which do not even recognize them formally as workers. However, 
overall forms of intimidation and arbitrary actions based on patronage and 
informal structures of power are not the outcome of the crisis, but rather an 
enduring feature of everyday life in the Greek countryside.
In conclusion, perhaps the very fact that precarity has been the norm for 
many since long before the crisis, explains the majority of our respondents’ 
difficulty in comprehending and perceiving the nature of the crisis.
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